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THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD REDEFINES
"MEDICAL EMPLOYEE" UNDER THE WAGNER ACT
REGARDING RESIDENTS AND INTERNS THEREBY
OPENING THE DOOR TO UNIONIZATION
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING DEMANDS
JACK E. KARNs*
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
On March 23, 1976, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
the Board) decided the Cedars-Sinai Medical Center1 case, in which it
concluded that a private, non-profit California Corporation engaged in
the operation of a medical center with numerous medical interns and
residents did not have employees working for it.2 The NLRB reached
this conclusion based upon the meaning of "employee" as interpreted
under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or
Wagner Act). 3 The Board found it difficult to effectuate the policies of
the NLRA by finding that these individuals were employees and entitled
to the privileges accorded by the statute.4 In this particular case, the
employer operated general hospitals, which were licensed to handle 530
beds, as well as the Mount Sinai hospital division, which was licensed for
up to 230 beds. 5 The petitioner sought to represent a portion of the
medical school's residents, interns, and clinical fellows and contended
that these individuals should be considered employees because most of
their work endeavors were more akin to those of a worker, than those of
a student. 6 Phrased differently, the time spent as a resident was not
necessarily part of the educational process, but rather was more like
being a low-paid employee learning the nuts and bolts of the profession.
Thus, residents, interns, and clinical fellows were deprived of the
protections of the NLRA simply due to an arbitrary classification.
The Board initially took a hard look at the process by which an
individual becomes a licensed physician. It noted that the medical
education and training of a physician necessarily involved a progression
* Professor of Business Law, East Carolina University, Greenville, N.C. S.J.D. (Candidate)
(Health Law and Policy), Loyola University Chicago; LL.M. (Taxation), 1992, Georgetown
University; J.D., 1981, Tulane University; M.P.A., M.S., 1974, B.A., 1973, Syracuse University.
1. 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976).
2. Id. at 254.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
4. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. at 252-53.
5. Id. at 251.
6. Id.
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from classroom and laboratory work to basic and clinical sciences. This
in turn evolved into an internship or residency where the individual
specialized in one aspect of medicine. 7 The residency is the period of
time where the individual learns the preventive diagnosis aspect of
treatment and therapy, as well as the management of patients. These
aspects of medical education cannot be taught in the classroom. 8
Accordingly, the rationale was that any training received by the residents
was in their status as students in a non-classroom environment, thus,
yielding insufficient justification to seek collective bargaining and
unionization rights as employees under the Wagner Act.9
An intern is defined as a medical school student who successfully
completed his or her first year of medical school and is receiving
training in a hospital. 10 In California, one year is required in order to
practice medicine. 11 A resident is defined as a physician who has com-
pleted an internship plus a period of more advanced training lasting any-
where from one to five years in a particular specialty.12 A clinical fellow
is defined as a physician who has completed both an internship and
residency and is doing post-graduate work a certification in a particular
specialty of medicine not taken during his or her residency period.13 In
the Cedars-Sinai opinion, the NLRB refers to the term "house staff."
This term is used to refer to a variety of medical and hospital personnel,
which includes all interns, residents, and clinical fellows.' 4
At the time the of the hearing, thirty-four interns, eighty-six resi-
dents, and twenty-four clinical fellows worked at Cedars-Sinai.15 The
National Intern and Resident Matching Program (NIRMP) governs the
training of medical students at Cedar-Sinai and their placement at the
institution. 16 This program takes graduating medical students, along
with their preferred graduate training institution, and attempts to match
them with an institution based on the institution's need and the student's
abilities.17 Students and hospitals register with the service or program
and sign an agreement binding them to the matching results.18
7. Id. at 252.
8. Id. at 251-52.
9. Id. at 251.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The term itself has now become one of common usage in referring to medical personnel,
and it will be used as such throughout this article.
15. Id. at 252.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Essentially, the graduating student makes out a preference list of
positions in conjunction with a personal interview at participating
hospitals approved by the American Medical Association (AMA). 19 The
hospitals also make a preference list of the student applicants. The
NIRMP attempts to accommodate the wants and needs of both the
institutions and the students by combining the graduating student's
preference list with the participating hospital's preference list.20 The
department director at Cedars-Sinai appoints residents and clinical fel-
lows, generally filling most of the positions with interns originally placed
there through the national matching program and who have completed
their first year as interns.21 These accrediting bodies are well known
within the medical field and have codes, procedures, and programs that
set forth the activities that all house staff follow throughout their
educational programs. 22
All educational or training programs consist of constant patient care
activities and are coordinated through a number of teaching and educa-
tional processes, all of which are designed to assist the student in devel-
oping his or her clinical proficiency prior to being authorized to practice
a particular specialty or sub-specialty. 23 Student experiences generally
include: the taking of medical histories, performing examinations, and
insuring that patient medical records and charts are up to date. Students
perform some diagnostic and therapeutic planning during educational
service rounds. These experiences are generally considered an integral
part of a physician's training, since the lead doctor will supervise a
group of individuals from patient to patient in order to aggregate a
significant number of learning experiences into a short period of time.24
In fact, "making rounds" has become a staple of the house staff
curriculum. The students are permitted to take elective courses and to
participate in rotations at other hospitals if they do not conflict with their
requirements and obligations at Cedars-Sinai. 25
On November 26, 1999, in a three-to-two decision, the NLRB issued
its opinion in Boston Medical Center Corp.,26 and overruled a quarter
century of precedent on the "medical resident as student" issue as
determined pursuant to the Cedars-Sinai case. 27 The Boston Medical
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1329 (1999).
27. In Boston Medical Center Corp., the majority ruled that the petitioner house staff were
employees within the context of the NLRA and entitled to its protection. Id. at 1332.
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decision held that medical house staff are employees and have the same
rights relative to collective bargaining, joining unions, and striking as
enjoyed by their fellow workers. 28 No longer would these individuals be
viewed as "students" completing their medical training and subject to
the austere work standards and conditions allowed under Cedars-Sinai.
A new day dawned, and it was not long before academic institutions
and leaders began denouncing the decision. Jordan C. Cohen, president
of the Association of Medical Colleges, stated that labor arbitration
"opens the door to all kinds of mayhem." 29 This was typical of the
overreaction from the academic-medical community so heavily
dependent upon the inexpensive skilled labor provided by house staff
personnel. 30
In the Boston Medical opinion, Member Brame concluded that
house staff personnel are "employees," but noted that this was far from
the end of the inquiry regarding employee status. 31 The critical factors
used by the Board in determining employee status included the receipt
of fringe benefits, a taxable stipend, and worker's compensation insur-
ance, in addition to the incredible total of work hours spent at the
hospital completing the "duties" of the "educational experience." 32
Interestingly, Brame first turned to the dictionary definition of "em-
ployee" before reviewing any legislative approaches offered by Con-
gress in the NLRA.33 While the dictionary definition proved sufficient,
the majority also analyzed the definition included in the NLRA and
found it to be in concert with the dictionary reading, as well as the
Board's holding. 34 The majority pointed to the medical profession's
post-graduation apprenticeship requirement for licensing and therefore
concluded that the profession essentially thrusted a worker status upon
the individual. 35
The majority also stated that a professional employee includes
anyone who performs work that requires knowledge pursuant to a
prolonged course of study and which requires the supervision of a
qualified, sometimes licensed, professional. 36 This covered house staff
28. Id.
29. Katherine S. Mangan, Academic Medicine Becomes a Target for Labor Organizing, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 6, 1999, at A14.
30. Id.
31. See Richard M. Kobdish, National Labor Relations Board Rules that Interns and Residents
May Unionize, 12 HEALTH LAW. 18 (Feb. 2000) (citing Boston Med. Ctr., 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1329).
32. Boston Med. Ctr., 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1340.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1340-41.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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personnel. 37 Additionally, Congress included references to residents and
interns in the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the NLRA,
an important point since the amendments brought non-profit healthcare
institutions under coverage of the statute. 38 The opinion stressed that
congressional concern as to resident and intern pay and working condi-
tions impliedly brought the forces of the NLRA into play.39 It was the
very manner in which workers were being mistreated by their employers
that initiated the struggle that resulted in passage of the NLRA. Finally,
the NLRB reviewed the developments in labor relations subsequent to the
decision in Cedars-Sinai and found that many courts and legal analysts
have concluded that interns, residents, and fellows are, in large measure,
employees.40 The majority was not persuaded that a change in prece-
dent would cause problems regarding patient care or endanger the
experience value that the house staff received as a result of being
reclassified as employees. 4 1
The thrust of this article deals with the differences between the
Cedars-Sinai and Boston Medical cases and the attendant controversies
within both legal and medical-academic circles. Emphasis is placed on
an explanation of the earlier case precedent in the context of the factors
and circumstances that surrounded it, as well as to provide adequate
explanation of Boston Medical and the contemporary need to treat
budding physicians with more consideration.4 2 The process of becom-
ing a licensed physician or specialist, combined with a financial dis-
incentive inadequate to meet family household needs, should not require
a commitment of time that exceeds all standards of reasonableness.
Cedars-Sinai and Boston Medical present these issues, and individuals on
both sides of the debate have squared off in a heated discussion regard-
ing the soundness of the change.
The author is firmly in favor of the Boston Medical decision and
feels that its opponents view the physician development process as a
form of fraternity hazing that is unhealthy in today's environment and
that has no place in the contemporary education and training of physi-
cians. This is not just a legal decision. It has severe social policy over-
tones and says much about how the United States believes would-be
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1341-42.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1343.
41. Id. at 1343-44. The Board stated, "We cannot subscribe to dissenting Member Brame's
forecast of doom to medical education as a consequence of our decision today." Id. at 1344.
42. Barry H. Bloch & Steven K. Sanborn, Boston Medical Center: The NLRB Changes Course,
CAMPBELL L. OBSERVER (Campbell Univ., Buis Creek, N.C.), Mar. 2000, at 3, 9.
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healthcare professionals should be treated. 43 Should they be denied a
personal and family life during the intern and residency periods, or
should a more humane approach be undertaken? As a society, we would
not sanction house staff treating their patients in the same manner that
the medical profession has treated them during the reign of the
Cedars-Sinai case. This article concludes with a brief look at the dissent
in the Boston Medical case, which substantiates the view that all compass
points aim toward a more humane environment for house staff, regard-
less of what vested members of medical fraternity may say.4 4 These
opponents are clearly stuck in the quicksand of the past.
II. CEDARS-SINAI-THE STUDENT STATUS ERA
The Cedars-Sinai house staff received an annual graduated stipend
based on the length of time that they had served as an intern through
fifth year residency. 45 The stipend was essentially a graduate study
scholarship, and it was not based upon the nature of the services provid-
ed, the number of hours that they spent in patient care, the type of
rotation in which they were involved, or the type of patients that they saw
on a regular basis.46 The house staff also received fringe benefits inclu-
ding: medical and dental care, an annual vacation, paid holidays, unif-
orms, meals while on duty, and malpractice insurance.4 7 They were not
eligible for the retirement program offered by Cedars-Sinai to its other
employees.4 8 A committee of peers handled any discipline problems
among the house staff.49
The length of the program an intern decided to pursue determined
the length of the time spent at the facility.50 At the time that Cedars-
Sinai was decided, the average stay of interns and residents was less than
two years.51 Regarding the clinical fellows, research demonstrates that in
1974-75, seven fellows were completing their first year.52 After the
completion of the Cedars-Sinai program, the vast majority of house staff
went on to a private practice, practice group, or some type of health
organization.5 3 Very few interns or residents expected to maintain any
43. Id.
44. See infra Part IV.
45. Cedars Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 252 (1976).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 253.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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type of employment relationship with Cedars-Sinai post-residency
because of its understood mission as a training facility. 54
The Board found that based on the record, as presented, the house
staff were primarily engaged in graduate education training and were not
employees. 55 The primary factor in the Board's decision was based on
the fact that the house staff participated in programs not for the purpose
of earning a living, but rather to pursue graduate medical education. 56
Physicians were required to complete an internship in order to become
licensed to practice medicine. 57 Therefore, at least the first year spent at
Cedars-Sinai was as a qualifying student and not as an employee. 58 As
for residency and fellowship programs, they were necessary to qualify
for specialty and sub-specialty certifications, although the house staff
spent a great deal of time in direct patient care. 59 It is important to
understand that this is the manner in which the hands-on learning
process is carried out during this phase of medical school education with
no acceptable substitute found as yet, or at least sanctioned, by the
professional licensing agencies. 60 Member Brame pointed out that it was
this direct involvement with patients that allowed the graduate medical
students the opportunity to acquire the type of diagnostic and clinical
skills that are critical to the practice of medicine. 61 In essence, the ma-
jority was sympathetic to the position taken by the members of the pro-
fession that house staff members were not employees. The entire Board
affirmed the decision on appeal, with Member Fanning dissenting. 62
Regardless of how many hours the house staff worked or the quality
of the care that they rendered to their patients, the amount of monetary
compensation was not changed. 63 The stipend remained fixed, and the
payments did not even cover living allowances, let alone constitute
adequate compensation for services rendered. 64 Furthermore, it was also
clear in Cedars-Sinai, as it is today, that house staff members do not give
much importance to the stipend since there is little difference regardless
of location; instead, their choice of matching hospitals was based upon
the quality of the educational program and the opportunities that existed
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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in terms of training experience at a particular institution.65 The quality
and reputation of the internship and residency program would have an
important impact on on an individual's placement once the residency or
fellowship period is over.66 There is clearly a tiering of matched
locations that determine a candidate's ultimate earning power and
attractiveness in the marketplace.
As stated previously, the whole purpose, even though not openly
espoused, was to provide skilled staffing at bargain basement prices.
House staff endured these conditions just to get their desired match,
while clinical proficiency was not the governing factor despite the
AMA's protestations. The strictures of the medical profession at that
time described the standards for approved internships and residencies
designating their primary function as educational, regardless of location.
Clearly, the majority applied the "thinking of the time" in ruling that
house staff members were students, not employees and with this conclu-
sion evaded any other "employee status" issues under section 9(c) of
the NLRA.67
Not so easily evaded was the strong dissent penned by Member
Fanning, which was premised on the fact that the Board had acknowl-
edged and held in other cases that students could be part of a bargaining
unit and vote in an election. 68 This slight wrinkle required that the
majority at least address Fanning's position, because his exhaustive
dissent was directed point blank at the student-employee issue. 69 It was
his thoughtful rationale that became the basis for the Boston Medical
opinion, and it deserves a thorough analysis at this point.
As the majority stated, it was well aware that students had been
included in bargaining units and that elections had been held where
students composed the bargaining unit entirely. However, what made
this case different, according to the majority, was the fact that the house
staff who would file the petition were primarily engaged in graduate
educational training.70 Fanning saw little merit to this argument because
he found the issue to be one of employee status as enunciated by the
NLRA and as interpreted by the Board. 7 1 The majority accused the
dissent of advancing considerations that had no bearing on the house
65. Id.
66. Id. A resident may be placed in private or organizational practice after completion of a
residency fellowship. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 254.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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staff with regard to the meaning of the Wagner Act.72 For example, the
dissent suggested that "hospital[s] charge[ ] fees in amounts which have
sparked national debate." 73 The majority also disagreed with the dis-
senting opinion's consideration of the proposition that the primary
interest of the house staff's petition was an increase or an improvement
in primary care of the patients involved. 74
The majority made it clear that this process is an important exten-
sion of the medical school educational program where the student has
the opportunity to decide exactly which area of medicine he or she will
concentrate in. This provides the house staff member with the opportu-
nity to sample a wide variety of specialties before making this decision
and allows him or her to do so under the tutelage of practicing
physicians. This depth and breadth of diagnostic experience is simply
not available in medical school. 75 A four-year medical school education
does not provide the opportunity to develop the type of diagnostic skills
that are critical to becoming a good physician. Accordingly, the majori-
ty determined that the Cedars-Sinai house staff was involved in an educa-
tional relationship with the institution and, thus, they were not employees
within the meaning of the Wagner Act.76 Based on this analysis, the
majority dismissed the petition filed by the house staff personnel. 77 A
review of many of the arguments contained within Member Fanning's
lengthy and in-depth dissent indicated the basis for the Boston Medical
decision that overturned the Cedars-Sinai decision several decades later.
Member Fanning's initial point made it clear that his objective was
not focused on the semantic difference between student and employee,
since that question had already been answered in previous NLRB cases. 78
Students had been part of bargaining units and had been authorized to
hold elections in which they were the sole voting group numerous times
before, and this was an established part of NLRB case law precedent. 79
Therefore, this particular case presented no revolutionary issue as far as
the distinction between student and employee was concerned.
The key issue, as Fanning saw it, was whether students were employ-
ees in addition to being classified as students.80 The medical students
could not only perform part of their educational requirements but could
72. Id. at 253.
73. Id. at 256.
74. Id. at 253.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 254.
78. Id. at 254-55.
79. Id. at 254.
80. Id.
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also work in a related environment deserving of the protection of the pro-
visions of the Wagner Act. This issue concerned him the most. As he
put it, "Are those doctors commonly denominated 'housestaff' entitled
to bargain collectively under the auspices of our statute and, if so, do
they possess a sufficiently distinct community of interests enabling them
to constitute an appropriate unit unto themselves?" 81
Fanning concluded that since the majority had taken this question
as its primary approach, then he would look at it in similar fashion.82
However, contrary to the majority, he emphasized the prospect of a
finding that house staff members could be students would not justify the
conclusion that they could not be employees within the letter and spirit
of the Wagner Act. 83 This position was diametrically opposed to the
rationale established by the Board. As Member Fanning pointed out
section 2(3) of the Wagner Act provided that an employee is meant to
include everyone, unless the NLRA explicitly states otherwise. 84 The stat-
ute goes on to enumerate a listing of worker categories that are excluded
from the definition. Students are not among those exclusions. 85 Mem-
ber Fanning suggests that the delineation between the two is due to
federal policy provisions. 86
However, he also noted that the NLRA had created two classes of
employees, and given the absence of any legislative history, the relation-
ship between students and employees was not mutually exclusive. There-
fore, the key question centered on whether the evaluation being made
regarding a particular individual had to be made outside the context of
any statutory exclusion. This necessitates a certain imprecision with re-
gard to defining the term "employee," but this was the result of a
deliberate refusal of the Wagner Act drafters to be more specific. 87
According to Fanning, the drafters of the Wagner Act made certain that
the definition of an employee was put forth in a "circular fashion":
"An employee includes any employee." 88
As a result, this multi-tiered statutory definition gave rise to several
conflicting views. The first looked at whether there was some sort of
declared policy and purpose under the NLRA that comprehended indi-
vidual rights guaranteed to be protected by the statute. This par-ticular
interpretation was bolstered by nothing more than the statement that it
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. ("One does not, necessarily, exclude the other ... .
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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was an effort to give something of an "ordinary meaning" to the term
employee used under the common law.89 Fanning then provided a more
basic and broad common law definition of employee, which traced its
roots to the relationship of master-servant law.
At common law a servant performed services for the master, with the
full knowledge that the master had the right of control and that the
servant had the right to be compensated upon completion of the work.
Member Fanning viewed this as the sine que non of establishing the
master-servant relationship. 90 As this relationship evolved, the formali-
ties that made it part of the common law began to fall by the wayside.
Increased attention was paid to the establishment of tortious liability for
the master for the acts committed by the servant.91 This, of course, was
the result of the doctrine of respondeat superior and plays a critical role
in current malpractice cases today. Fanning made the point that the
majority ignored this very significant part of the hospital house staff
relationship, that of vicarious liability, and that there exists a certain level
of liability for the hospital with regard to the actions of the house staff
that is relative to medical malpractice. 92 On this count, the majority
failed to explore the full range of liability and was too quick in conclud-
ing that the master-servant doctrine need not be discussed. 93
The dissent referred specifically to the number of hours that the
house staff worked each week. He discussed the around-the-clock,
seven-days-a-week work period that is peculiar to house staff status. Par-
ticularly disturbing was the requirement of working over one hundred
hours a week, in shifts often exceeding fifty consecutive hours. 94 It was
not uncommon to see an emergency room with only house staff at times
when supervising physicians were not even in the facility. The majority
failed to correctly consider these critical facts. Of equal concern was the
fact that after having been awake for over forty hours, these individuals,
with no supervision, might have to perform a serious procedure on a
small child, administer potentially lethal medications, and do so in a man-
ner that would pass muster under the rules of malpractice negligence. 95
In return for this medical supervision by trained experts, the house
staff received a stipend that barely covered their living expenses and
from which federal taxes, state taxes, and social security taxes were
89. Id.
90. Id. at 255.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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withheld.96 Should the house staff member perform in a negligent
fashion, the hospital and any supervisory personnel also stood to be
potentially liable. 97 The disparity regarding the level of evidence present-
ed as to whether any type of evaluation was made of house staff would
surely have been one point of contention in any litigation. Consequent-
ly, this argument by the majority lacked substantial basis. As to the
argument that the individuals are primarily students, the Association of
American Medical Colleges (AAMC) pointed out that about eighty per-
cent of the house staff time is spent "in direct patient care activities." 98
However, just because someone is learning while performing a particular
service to an individual patient, does not mean that he or she cannot also
be classified as an employee for purposes of the Wagner Act. The
majority was not persuaded by this particular fact and paid little attention
to the variety of factors, which the NLRB relied upon in previous cases,
when determining whether or not an individual was an employee.
Member Fanning paid special attention to "Essentials," 99 public-
ations in which the majority relied in reaching its conclusion that the
house staff are students. lOO It might be said that the "Essentials" consti-
tute at least guidelines, if not contracts, relative to the manner in which
hospitals are to treat these incoming medical school graduates. Even
though "Essentials" emphasizes that the hospitals are supposed to look
at the primary purpose as educational, this has no bearing on whether the
house staff is ultimately entitled to compensation for a service which
they perform, or whether the house staff are also entitled to be viewed as
employees pursuant to the master-servant relationship.101 These guide-
lines acknowledge that the relationship between hospitals and house staff
are the mandate of "employment agreements," which should specify at
a minimum, salary, vacation, and duty hours. 102 The majority conveni-
ently overlooked this point, since it is clear that the "Essentials" publica-
tions view the learning process during the residency phase of instruction
as deserving of a variety of compensation forms.103
Even more important was that on January 13, 1975, the American
Medical Association (AMA) sent out a memorandum to all AMA
96. Id.
97. Id. at 256.
98. Id.
99. Essentials," as they are referred to by Member Fanning, include both "Essentials of an Ap-
proved Internship" and "Essentials of Approved Residencies." Id. at 252. Prepared by the Council on
Medical Education and approved by the American Medical Association, "Essentials" provide a set of
guidelines for interns and residents to follow while they complete their internships and residencies. Id.
100. Id. at 256.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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approved teaching hospitals, noting that it had adopted "guidelines for
house staff contracts or agreements and that this had been done by the
house of delegates." 0 4 This was very instructive, in that the AMA used
the word contract or agreement when talking about any form of compen-
sation that residents or house staff should receive. Again, the majority
overlooked this particular fact. These guidelines provided three things.
First, the agreement should be fair and equitable, relative to conditions of
employment. Second, the institution must be aware of the need to accept
the house staff's input relative to establishing in-house procedures.
Third and finally, the institution should recognize that the house staff
have a right to put forth the means by which they should be organized,
relative to receiving their training, and house staff contracts should be
freely negotiated.105 This latter point included the comment that the
contract with the institution may be negotiated either individually or
collectively and that any terms regarding training should not be denied
or infringed. 106 It also stated, "No contract should require or proscribe
that members of the housestaff shall or shall not be members of an
association or union." 107 At this point the AMA memorandum dis-
cussed a variety of very important employment related subjects. These
included: shift hours, off duty activities, vacation, leave, insurance lia-
bility, and grievance procedures.1 08 Member Fanning was stunned that
the majority reached its opinion without at least some discussion of these
compelling factors that are contained within the guidelines. 109
Fanning believed the evidence clearly showed that the house staff's
primary concern was to improve patient care and, thereby, enhance the
quality of the institution.110 Fanning stated that no one benefits when
overworked and exhausted house staff members are providing services
without the supervision of a trained physician and when the host hospital
is exposed to a wide range of medical malpractice claims. Further, he
was incredulous that the majority found no argument to support the
conclusion that under section 2(11) and (12) of the Wagner Act, these
individuals are employees.11 1 The majority again merely footnoted its
response to these significant considerations and overlooked case law,
statutory language, and legislative history.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 257.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 258.
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Just one year after Cedars-Sinai, the case of St. Clare's Hospital &
Health Center 112 came before the NLRB and gave the administrative
agency another opportunity to address the same question. In St. Clare's
Hospital, the agency went a step further and noted that the distinction
between employee and student was one of national labor policy. Further-
more, there was a grave danger that if collective bargaining were permit-
ted among house officers, it would go far beyond the strictures of the
Wagner Act. 113 In fact, house staff work could be evaluated with regard
to academic freedom, and any type of collective bargaining could limit
the individual's right to challenge program content or instructional
method. 114 In other words, the NLRB was saying that these issues had
no place at the bargaining table. It seems fair to speculate that dissenter
Fanning's likely response would be that the house staff would not
dispute that the internship residency process plays an important role in
their educational process and that matters regarding program content
remained the province of the host institution. However, when the focus
is switched to work shifts that exceed forty and fifty hours, along with
receiving minimum wage salaries, Fanning would argue that these are
issues that ought to be on the collective bargaining table. This should be
the case even if some sort of prearranged agreement is reached regard-
ing the limited reach of any collective bargaining process.
If given this opportunity, the house staff would readily agree to
some sort of restriction on the number and range of topics that would be
available for collective bargaining discussion and that none of the topics
would have anything to do with diminishing the quality of patient care.
If anything, it might mean that the doctors on staff with the hospital
might have to work more hours or that the hospital might have to hire
more staff physicians, since house staff would likely focus primarily on
pay and working conditions. These are also the issues that the manage-
ment team least wants thrust upon it in a collective bargaining setting.
But this is the hospital's problem since the primary contention is that the
apprenticeship served by a resident is part of the educational process,
and this is inextricably bound to the argument that house staff members
are grossly underpaid and overworked. They provide the inexpensive,
skilled labor that allow hospitals to garner profits that are dispropor-
tionate to the actual cost of services. Hospitals ought not be permitted to
profit at the expense of house staff by placing the patient population in
a less than safe environment. Medical academics disagree with this
112. 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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assessment, arguing that neither is an issue in the student versus employ-
ee debate regarding house staff training. 115
III. BOSTON MEDICAL-THE EMPLOYEE DEFINITION CHANGE
On November 26, 1999, the NLRB issued its opinion in Boston
Medical Corp., 116 upsetting the years of case law precedent since
Cedars-Sinai and sending shock waves through many teaching hospitals
regarding the manner in which contract negotiations with house staff
would be handled. In October 1997, the NLRB regional director for the
Boston region dismissed the petition filed by the interns and residents of
the Boston Medical Center Corporation (BMC) seeking certification as a
unit for collective bargaining as employees pursuant to the appropriate
sections of the Wagner Act. 117 The house staff officers who filed the
petition were aware of the precedent set forth in Cedars-Sinai Medical, as
clarified in the St. Clare's Hospital case, but believed that it was
appropriate for the Board to look to the strong dissent filed in Cedars-
Sinai and rule that the individuals were not only students, but employees
as well. 118 The NLRB concluded in Boston Medical that after twenty
plus years of Cedars-Sinai, it was time to treat house staff personnel as
both students and employees pursuant to the Wagner Act.119
BMC funds a 432-bed, non-profit, teaching hospital in Boston,
Massachusetts that focuses on acute care cases. 120 Not only does it
provide in-patient services, but it also provides outpatient services on a
twenty-four hour emergency basis. 121 It also serves as the primary teach-
ing facility for Boston University School of Medicine.122 As a result,
BMC sponsors thirty-seven different residency programs varying from
three to five years, with a few that last a little longer.123 At any given
time there are about 430 house officers in the unit, all of which were pres-
ent on July 1, 1996.124 This is the date that the Boston City Hospital and
the Boston University Medical Center Hospital were consolidated since
the two hospitals were located a block apart, with the Boston University
School of Medicine in between. 125 It seemed appropriate that BMC
should affiliate with the University School of Medicine and that some of
115. See, e.g., Magnan, supra note 28.
116. 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1329 (1999).
117. Id. at 1332.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1333.
125. Id.
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the residency programs should be integrated prior to the merger of the
two hospitals.
Boston City Hospital (BCH) was a public sector institution and,
therefore, was subject to the state public employee collective bargaining
law under which all house staff had a right to organize in union fashion
according to federal and state law. 126 The petitioner in this case repre-
sented a unit of house staff at BCH since 1969 and negotiated about ten
collective bargaining agreements with BCH since 1970.127 One condi-
tion of the 1996 merger between BCH and University Hospital was that
the Boston City Council required that BMC recognize the petitioner as a
collective bargaining representative of the existing 280 former house
staff personnel from the public sector hospital.128 BMC signed this
recognition agreement, agreeing to allow similar representation among
all house officers at the merged entity.129 On August 29, 1996, the issue
flared as to whether or not the parties wanted the NLRB to supervise an
election that would ultimately determine unionization and collective
bargaining rights. 130
It is important to understand the unique conditions of BMC's
residency programs in relation to those at other hospitals. The programs
at BMC were funded at least in part through direct or indirect medical
education payments coming from medicare payments from the federal
government.131 These payments were based on historical costs of the
medical center that used a formula that incorporated the total number of
house staff that enroll in a particular medical residency program at
BMC.132 Like all institutions that sponsor medical residency programs,
BMC starts its academic year on July 1 of each year, and the students
who are half-way through their fourth year of medical school decide the
area of medicine that they wish to pursue and apply to appropriate
medical programs for matching at that time. 133 BMC receives hundreds
or even thousands of applications from which only a small percentage of
applicants are chosen to interview for individual residency programs.1 34
The match list is initially set up in March so that by summer it is well
in place, and individuals know where they are going.135 Finally, no
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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matching process exists with fellowships; they are handled on a
case-by-case basis with the teaching hospital involved.136
The interns, residents, and fellows work for physicians, known as
"attendings," and these physicians are also faculty of the Boston Univer-
sity School of Medicine. 137 The attendings are technically employees of
the Faculty Practice Plan Foundation, Inc., an umbrella corporation for a
variety of subsidiary practice plans that are in place for all departments
within the hospital.138 The attendings receive their paychecks from the
School of Medicine, which hires them just like the house staff per-
sonnel.139 As Senator Cranston, a co-sponsor of the 1974 amendments
noted, the legislation was intended to affect the notorious reputation of
the meager salaries given to these individuals.140 The majority also
looked at nearly every aspect of the Cedars-Sinai case and sided with the
position taken by Member Fanning in the dissent.141
IV. CONCLUSION
The Boston Medical Corp. case also included an important dissent
written by Member Hurtgen, which began:
For more than 20 years, the Board has held that interns, resi-
dents, and fellows (house staff) are not employees entitled to
bargain collectively under the Act. As discussed infra, the
courts have endorsed this position, as has the Congress of the
United States. I see no reason now to proceed 180 degrees in
the opposite direction. Instead, I agree with the result and
rationale reached in those cases. I incorporate by reference the
rationale of those cases, and thus need not repeat it here.142
The limited scope of this rationale leaves much to be desired from
an analytical perspective. First, the essence of the common law is that
change makes the law real and in accordance with contemporary moral,
ethical, and legal values. Just because residents and interns have been
mistreated for twenty years pursuant to Board precedent provides insuf-
ficient reasons to ignore the basic legal, if not humane, need to change
the law. Member Hurtgen would have us follow outdated case law just
on precedent alone. This argument is not supported by a wide variety of
case decisions that affect a number of societal rights and values.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1342.
141. See generally id.
142. Id. at 1348.
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Criminal procedure and a woman's right to choose birth or abortion are
merely two examples. In the last thirty years these two areas have seen
tremendous case law change, all sanctioned within the context that the
common law is a living law that does not just allow for such change, but
rather demands it at the appropriate time in history.
Second, Member Hurtgen revealed only a portion of the facts when
he stated that Congress endorsed the holding in Cedars-Sinai and the
cases that followed. The fact is that Congress took significant action in
the 1974 amendments to the NLRA in an attempt to address some of the
inequities faced by house staff. 143 Senator Cranston's comment is testa-
ment to that fact and directly contradicts the Hurtgen dissent. Simply
stated, it was time for change, and the Boston Medical case made a posi-
tive, decent change in the case law, which was backed by statutory prece-
dent as well as by common ethical standards. 144 For Member Hurtgen to
overlook this crucial point in his dissent is highly unusual given the need
to support his strong conclusion with a balanced rationale.
Regardless, the Board reached the correct result in this case, and it is
sure to have a significant impact on the quality of life for house staff
personnel around the country for years to come.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 38, 148.
144. Two commentators foresee other implications of the Boston Medical case that go beyond
the limited scope of the opinion.
This decision will likely result in attempts to unionize house staffs throughout the
country .... The threat of strikes, although disapproved by groups such as the AMA,
potentially provides residents with a powerful tool to negotiate improvements. However,
only time will tell what type of disruption strikes may cause to this country's system of in-
patient care and medical education.
This decision could have other far reaching implications, such as on negotiations with
managed care organizations. There are still two roadblocks inhibiting physicians from
organizing: labor laws and antitrust laws. The NLRA only offers protection to bargain-
ing units of employees who are neither managers nor supervisors. A physician may be
considered an "employee" if the "employer" exercises control over the manner and
means of performance, not just the end result. In regard to antitrust, physician
competitors cannot organize or bargain collectively unless they have achieved a high
degree of financial or clinical integration.
It is clear that this change in the law has the potential of creating a revolution in
medical education. What remains to be seen is whether that revolution will merely
strengthen the entire profession's ability to bargain with insurance companies and
managed care organizations, or whether unionization will cause a realignment of
professional values and priorities.
Strong arguments can be made for both positions that such changes are needed to
maintain the availability of high quality care. Unless physicians can resist and overcome
third-party payors' efforts to limit the expense of and access to healthcare, it is likely that
public trust in the profession, as well as the physicians' incomes, are likely to erode. Of
course, if organized physicians ever strike, as they have in other countries, it may erode
public trust as well ....
Bloch & Sanborn, supra note 42, at 3, 9.
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